When China’s foreign policy met Oman’s regional development plans
When Qaboos bin Said assumed the throne of Oman in 1970, he had a grand vision to modernize the Sultanate. He built roads connecting the capital, Muscat, with the rest of the territory, and in the 1990s he divided the country into a series of governorates with regional capitals to create a network of medium sized urban areas. And yet, Muscat seemed to capitalize the most from all these policies. Today, the sprawling metropolis counts 1.7 million people of the approximately 5.5 who live in the Sultanate. That means that almost one in three Omani residents live in Muscat. However, Qaboos’s cousin and successor, Sultan Haitham, may be witnessing how the winds of change are blowing from China. And one of the main culprits might be solar energy.
Two cities, Ibri and Nizwa, provide two illuminating examples of what is changing, and what opportunities it may bring for regional development.
Let’s start with Ibri, a city of a bit over 100,000 residents at the edge of the Rubaʿ al-Khali desert and the fertile Batinah plains. In 2022, a 500-megawatt solar plant was inaugurated in its premises under the name of Ibri II, covering 120 hectares and capable of generating electricity for 33,000 homes. The deal was brokered by the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and included the participation of Chinese energy giants like Jinko. Regional actors, like the Saudi ACWA Power, were also part of the deal. A highway connecting Oman with Saudi Arabia via Ibri opened in 2021 as part of the same development plan. Until then, the only land route between both countries went through the United Arab Emirates. The success of the new corridor has led to plans for a “port in the desert” offering commercial infrastructure and tax incentives, potentially bringing Ibri back to its historical role as a central commercial hub between the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean. What started as plans for a solar plant near the city became a catalyst for the development of a new trade corridor where Ibri plays a central role.
A similar story can be told about Nizwa, the historic capital of the Imamate of Oman,. The city has witnessed grassroots initiatives since the 1990s to develop tourism infrastructure around its ancient fort and souq. The state soon chipped in, designing a comprehensive plan for urban renewal based on heritage and ecotourism. Yet, only a few miles south of the city, not one but two solar farms with a total capacity of 1 gigawatt emerge in sight, the plants of Manah I and Manah II. The plants best represent the industrial component from the development plan of Nizwa. As it was the case in Ibri, Chinese partners have been crucial for their planning, construction, and operation, and have catalyzed the investment of other international partners in associated industries. What started as a local effort to highlight Nizwa’s past has now become a multisectoral development plan.
While Ibri II functioned as the initial trigger that spurred industrial and economic investment for a logistics corridor, in Nizwa, Manah I and II show how solar can comfortably add to urban development projects even when energy is not their main axis. The truth is that, in both cases, solar energy plays a central role. But why?
Solar energy has very different geographical requirements than oil, the main source feeding Oman’s economic system. Oil can only be extracted wherever it is found, and the gigantic tankers used to ship it require incredibly deep ports that can only be built in very specific locations. Instead, the sun is everywhere. While there are some areas more optimal than others for a solar plant, developers can take into account many other factors. They can find areas where new logistics corridors would create economic opportunities. Or find cheaper land in faraway places. Or partner with other organizations (local or foreign) interested in investing here or there. They can also pinpoint regions where the state may have an interest in developing industrial opportunities for locals, and even attract residents from across the country and around the world. And of course, they can be instruments for the Omani government to help the countryside catch up with Muscat.
Will projects like those in Ibri and Nizwa help the Omani country catch up with Muscat? Only time will tell, but so far it seems the Omani countryside has found a partner like no other in China. Beijing is the global superpower in solar design, production, and operation, and in recent years it has become the fourth source of foreign direct investment in Oman, only surpassed by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Kuwait. In 2024, this amount reached 1.3 billion Omani rial (3.38 billion dollars). Not all of it falls into renewables, but as Ibri and Nizwa show, it might be enough to make a difference in a policy towards the regions that Sultan Qaboos and now Sultan Haitham have been chasing for decades.